

Corruption, Political Party System and Nigerian Democracy: An Historical Analysis from 1960 – 2019

Aristotle Isaac Jacobs¹, Tarabina Veronica Pamo¹, Abidde Kilegha Victoria²

¹Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Port Harcourt, Nigeria

²Department of Public Administration, School of Commerce and Management,
Bayesla State Polytechnic, Yenagoa, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

Liberal democracy all over the world is a welcome phenomenon. In every modern society the game of politics is influenced tremendously by the elite class that projects the political culture which could make or mar democracy, as a result of the activities of the political parties. The adoption of western democracy is a mixed bag of blessing and catastrophes in the body politics of the country. Today, it is difficult to reconcile Nigerian democracy with that of the advanced democratic Countries. In Nigeria, politics is regarded as a “dirty game” which scares away the down-trodden people. It has been noted that the level of socio-economic development in the country is significantly related to the nature of politics in vogue. Political parties are primarily aimed at primitive accumulation of wealth. Where, “the end justifies the means”. The prevailing election rigging, thuggery, corruption, fear and intimidation by security agencies as well as hate speech in the campaigns of the politicians reflect value degeneration with the attendant instability in the country’s democracy. To this end, the paper examined political parties in Nigeria: An historical Perspective from 1960 – 2019; looking at the roles of political parties as they affect the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Three (3) theoretical frameworks were used in the study namely: Social learning theory (SLT), Social Disorganization theory (SDT) and Corruption Permissiveness theory (CPT). The study noted that Nigeria’s political parties from 1960-2019 has witnessed some challenging situation like: ethnicity, corruption, violence, military intervention, civil and electoral deficiencies. Based on the findings, the study recommended among others that registered political parties should not be vehicles for the articulation and implementation of ethnic, religious or regional projects and programmes; and that they should remain national in scope, courage and orientation.

KEYWORD: Corruption, Political party system, Nigerian democracy and Historical analysis

INTRODUCTION

Politics is all about authoritative allocation of values in the political system by politicians and those who work with them. The nature of politics is subsumed in the culture of the elite and political parties. Aristotle, (2008), Ugwu, (2008) and Ake (1992) are of the view that the elite class and political parties that determines how politics should be conducted are indirectly responsible for the level of socio-cultural and socio-economic development of the Country. In developed and developing Countries of the world, one of the things that everyone yearns for in a political society is good governance. Good governance guarantees the common good which Confucius calls “Public good”. Aristotle calls it a “good life” and in Nigeria it’s referred to as “Democratic dividend”. This common good is achieved through the patriotic zeal effort and contribution of every citizen through the enabling condition of the machinery which pilots the affairs of the state. To Aristotle, “Public God” or “good life” is the very essence of forming a political society (Aristotle, 2012, pp.1-9).

Various shades of vices ranging from tribalism, indiscipline, licentiousness, ethno-religious violence, book-haram insurgency, Fulani-herdsmen attacks, kidnapping, cultism, juvenile gang, vandalism, yahooism, election thuggery, ritual killing, armed robbery, embezzlement of public funds, sycophancy, sabotage, oppression, marginalization among others has become regular features which could mar the roles played by political parties in the consolidation of Nigeria’s democracy.

According to Grace Brown, in her article titled: “Nigerian Political System: An Analysis” posited that “the polity has been characterized by ethno –religious politics which has been the bane to national unity. In the Nigerian case study, the reconfiguration, formation of political Parties, distribution of human and material resources and even crises (Coup, Civil War, Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen and religious impasse) are hinged on ethno-religious politics. Thus providing Nigeria with a chequered history, with

How to cite this paper: Aristotle Isaac Jacobs | Tarabina Veronica Pamo | Abidde Kilegha Victoria "Corruption, Political Party System and Nigerian Democracy: An Historical Analysis from 1960 – 2019" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-5 | Issue-1, December 2020, pp.983-992, URL: www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd38079.pdf



Copyright © 2020 by author(s) and International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development Journal. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0) (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>)



political transition from civilian to military, military to military, military to civilian and civilian to civilian; through a democratic, authoritarian, a combination of both or an innovation of a process too unique to be described only in action by its proponents – the political elites.” (Brown, 2013, p.172). The Nigerian democracy when compared with the advanced democratic nations shows a marked departure from what politics is all about (Okoyen, 2019).

Ake (1992) was right to state that the nature of democratic practices goes a long way to determine the level of socio-economic, culture and value development of the country. If one may ask: What is the level of our socio-economic and cultural development? What political direction in Nigeria taking to? Can one exonerate the Nigerian elites and political parties from the democratic miasma that the country is passing through vis-à-vis tribal politics? (Aristotle, 2008; Nnoli, 1978). And should the Nigerian factor (corruption) increase to consolidate Nigerian democracy?

Concept of Corruption

Corruption is a Social problem (Aristotle, 2008, p.134). The term “corruption” as a concept in social and classical science do not have a universally accepted definition. For Aristotle, “corruption is the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty or the unwanted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal”.

To buttress the definition above, Nkom in his article on *Ethical revolution as an antidote for corruption in Nigeria: The futility of bourgeois idealism* posited that corruption is the perversion of public office, for private advantage (Aristotle, (2012; Uduigwomen, 2006; Nkom in Akpotor, 1982).

Looking at a broader and operational definition that suits this paper corruption is a deliberate act of indiscipline against the legalized moral norms of the state and the natural law of justice, as it affects the realization of the common good of the citizen; whereby an individual or a group of individuals, directly diverts or misuse, with the tool of political maneuvering, the wealth of the state to his/her personal use (Asuquo in Uduigwomen, 2006, p.202).

Typologies of Corruption

Under this unit, we will examine the typology of corruption scholarly stated Syed Hussein Alatas (Grie in Aristotle, 2008, p.136). They are seven in number namely: Autogenic, defensive, extortive, invective, nepotistic, supportive and transitive corruptions.

1. Autogenic corruption involves just the perpetrator himself. Most times he or she capitalizes on the ignorance of others at that given time to excel.
2. Defensive corruption arises whenever an individual faces an unpleasant Situation and is looking for a way out. This is where bribery comes in.
3. Extortive Corruption is when a person coercively, methodically demands for something in exchange of services. For instance, soliciting for tips from a customer on services rendered.
4. Invective corruption involves the act of watering the ground in anticipation of future favor.

5. Nepotistic corruption entails unjustified appointment of friends, relations, party sycophants to public offices in violation of the accepted guideline.
6. Supportive corruption involves actions taken to protect the existing corruption. This of course, has become a common political silencer in the hands of most rulers to close the people’s mouth. They make laws to fight corrupt opponents and yet, they themselves are not free from corruption.
7. Transactive corruptive involves two corrupt minds who willingly agreed to be partner in crime provided, they are at advantage (Uduigwomen, 2007, p. 202).

Political Party: Problem of Definition

As Agi (2003), Curtis (1978) and Rowe (1969) remind us, that an acceptable definition of political party is difficult to attain. Alexander Pope cynically defined a political party as “madness of the masses for the gain of the few; while, Edmund Burke sees party as a body of men united for promoting their join endeavor the national interest upon some particular principles in which they all agreed” One can safely ignore Pope’s definition for its cynicism and Burke’s because modern political parties are no longer defined as a platform where, the people have the same ideas. What is more, it seemingly smacks of gender insensitivity (Aristotle, 2008).

Eldersveld (1964) considered the party from a behavioral viewpoint as a “social group” engaging in “patterned activity.” Epstein in Aristotle, (2012, p.4) on the other hand, defined it as “any group however loosely organized seeking to elect governmental office- holders under a given label.” And Coleman and Rosberg (1966) assert that:

Political parties are associations formally organized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition or electoral competition with other similar associations over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or prospective sovereign state (p.41).

Political System: Attributes

Political system can be defined as the members of a social organization who are in power within a geographical setting as determined by time, interest (elites/less often except through revolution) and some other prevalent climate of opinion. It involves the following kinds: autocracy, theocracy, republic, diarchy, and democracy among other (Brown, 2013, p. 173). Political system provides the platform on which political parties are formed, thus a precursor to political parties which later makes a political System desirable to guarantee good governance for the masses or socialize and mobilize the masses to yearning for change. Thus, the functional definition of political parties which distinguishes them from other social organization/interest groups structure electoral choice and conduct the business of government under a party label or banner (Jinadu, 2011, p.1).

In the Nigerian context therefore, the desirous political system is democracy, which is the strictest of sense, utopian. Stressing on the functionality of political system in the allocation of scare resources, Maurice A. Coker maintains that, the success of this depends on the quality and or quantity of the demands’ and ‘supports’ which are generated

in the environment and fed into the political system” (Coker, 1999, p.48). Also, Brown (2013), Almond and Powell (1966) argue that for a political system to persist, there are several functional pre-requisites which must be performed – divided into inputs’ and ‘outputs’: (i) Political socialization and recruitment (ii) interest aggregation (iii) interest articulation (iv) pattern maintenance and adaptation (v) rule making (vi) rule application (vii) rule adjustment. (Coker, 1999, p.48).

Notably, political parties, while they vary in many ways, share many functions necessary to the selection and maintenance of order in government. In fulfilling these functions, they simplify the political complexity:

1. The first function is the most viable. The party first of all gives the candidate a label that serves to introduce him to the voters and to identify his position. Because of this party label, the voters are better able to distinguish the candidates.
2. The political party provides a link between rulers and the ruled. The party is a channel of expression, both upward and downward, which is crucial to the political management of complex societies. Since the upward flows of communication from ruled to rulers is relatively strong. Hence, the party functions as a vehicle for informing, educating and influencing public opinion.
3. Parties also serve as important agents of interest aggregation they transform a multitude of specific demands into more measurable packages of proposal.
4. When in government party leaders are centrally involved in the task of setting and implementing collective goals for society.
5. Parties also exercise important functions as agents of elite recruitment and socialization. They serve as a major mechanism through which candidate for public office are prepared and selected at all levels, and in particular by which national political leadership is chosen.
6. Political parties are often the objects of powerful emotional attachment (or antagonism), exerting an important influence upon the opinion and behavior of their supporters (Agi, 2003).

We may regard all the foregoing as positive functions of political party.

Negative Roles of Political Parties

First, they may polarize opinion in ways dangerous to the stability of the political system. Also, the legislative isolation of large parties could mean the effective disenfranchisement of their Supporters. Third, the various functions of political may clash with political System (Aristotle, 2012, p.10).

Agi (2003, p.299) summarized the negative roles of political parties as:

Among the first, we may list the following authorization and democratic, integrative and representative. Ideological and pragmatic, issue-oriented and client-oriented, national and regional; religious and secular, democratic and oligarchic, close and competitive aggregative and ideological; pluralist or monopolist, confusion and profusion oriented.

Theoretical Framework on Corruption

Corruption is a complicated phenomenon. Olusola (2016) called it “simultaneously economic political criminal and

sociological in origin” (p.57) Zhang, Cao, and Vaughn (2009) argued for criminological and criminal-justice-based research on Corruption. They noted that despite the proliferation of studies on corruption most research on corruption comes from such disciplines as economics and political science. Meng and Friday (2010) argued since corruption is a criminal act, it demands an integrated theoretical approach that considers the prevailing criminal justice, economic, political, environment and social norms of a given society (Olusola, 2016, p.58).

For the purpose of this paper, Social learning theory (SLT), Social Disorganization theory (SDT) and Corruption permissiveness theory (CPT) can be adequately utilized as a lens to view the institutionalization of corruption in Nigeria and how it has affected values and behavioral norms. These theories help explain the behavioral and environmental determinants that facilitates corruption, as well as the social environment in which corruption operates in Nigeria (Olusola, 2016).

Social Learning theory (SLT)

Social learning theory has been used by some researchers to explain criminal behavior (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). This theory is based on the assumption that a similar learning process can produce both deviance and conformity. Four variables are thought to influence social behavior: definitions, differential association, modeling and reinforcement. The interaction of their variable predisposes one to either conforming or deviant behavior (Olusola, 2016, p.58; Singer and Hensley, 2004; Title, 2004).

According to social learning theory, behavior is influenced by standards of legal and illegal behavior, peers, and positive or negative reinforcement. A key variable is differential association, or peer influence. Definitions of deviance are developed in interactions with peers and are reinforced, positively or negatively, by rewards and punishments (Akers and Sellers, 2009).

Bernard, Snipes and Gerould (2010) characterized social learning theory as acknowledgement that learning involves an inter-play of environmental behavioral and cognitive influences. Criminal or deviant behavior, then, result in part from the observation of consequences that particular behaviors have for other people (Akers and Sellers in Olusola, 2016). Although Social learning theory addresses potential influences on criminal behavior, it does not address the particular environments that create such behaviour. Bernard et al. (2010), suggested that social structures affect crime because it affects one’s exposure to norms and the consequences of violating norms.

Social learning theorists argue that behavior is influenced by ones’ self-concept, one’s social role, and how one perceives a social situation (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). Each of these, in turn, is the product of the socialization that occurs at the institutional level (Meng and Friday 2010). A social problem such as corruption, then, is affected not only by material incentives but also by cultural orientations, which are the result of socialization (Olusola, 2016; Travits, 2010; Meng and Friday, 2010; Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005).

According to Aluko (2002), despite the fact that social learning theory has been extensively studied, efforts to

examine the mechanism linking social structure to corruption and its effects on social attitudes have been lacking. The result is poor understanding of how particular social conditions lead to corrupt practices in the political System. This Current study helped test the utility of social learning theory by applying it to an analysis of Nigerians perceptions of corruption and how those perceptions are determined by their social role and definition of corrupt practices.

Travits (2010) found that for citizens and officials, the decision whether to engage in Corruption is mostly affected by individual's definitions of corruption and personal perceptions of how widespread corruption is.

Moreover, Travits (2010) noted that research by political scientist and economist has addressed cross-national differences of perceptions of corruption. This research focused mostly on structural features, with less emphasis on why some officials are more susceptible to corrupt behavior than others. Based on social learning them, corruption, although socially influenced, is ultimately a result of individual choices. Although institutions and systems can be restricted, if individual motivations are not taken into account, restructuring may be difficult to achieve (Olusola, 2016, P.59).

Title (2003) linked band social structural conditions to individual learning. A subculture of deviance is transmitted inter-generationally through beliefs, values, and attitudes. Social learning theory, then proposed that a willingness to engage in corruption reflects an acquired belief that it is not morally wrong but rather is an acceptable form of behavior. Although social learning theory has been influential in criminological circles, it has been used mostly to explain crime and delinquency in general rather than corruption specifically (Olusola, 2016, p.59; Chappell and Piguero, 2004, p. 90).

Social Disorganization Theory (SDT)

Social disorganization theory originated as part of the Chicago school, a body of work focusing on urban sociology in the 1920s and 30s (Olusola, 2016; Bernald, Snipes and Gerould, 2010).

According to social disorganization theory, dysfunctional behavior has cultural, political, and economic causes (Akers and Sellers, 2009). Established communities experience increases in deviance and crime when their way of life and the established order change. Disorganized communities experience crime because informal social controls break down, resulting in the emergence of deviance and criminal cultures. Such communities lack the collective efficacy to fight crime and disorder (Hochstetler and Copes, 2008; Vito, Maahs and Homes, 2007). The theory surmise that more crime will occur in neighborhoods with fraying social structures, such as failing schools, vacant or vandalized buildings, changing ethnicity, and high unemployment.

The Sociological perspective out of which social learning theory emerged does not consider specific behavior as a problem of an individual but instead considers individual behavior as reflecting the social order in which an individual life. This assumption agrees with Durkheim's notion that all behavior is socially generated. Social problems like

corruption must be addressed by focusing on a society, not a particular individual behavior (Steenbeek and Hipp, 2011). Johnson in Olusola, 2016, p.60) used social disorganization theory to argue that in many nation corruption is embedded in the overall society. In the words of Johnson, economic and political, processes perpetuate corruption rather than resist it. In line with the assumptions of social disorganization theory, corruption can be reduced by developing enhanced criminal justice, political social economic and religious institutions, which will bring about social empowerment (Olusola, 2016).


Corruption Permissiveness Theory (CPT)

Corruption permissiveness theory is coined or propounded by Aristotle Isaac Jacobs in 2019, this theory draw inspiration from the work of Cecilia Lavena, (2013) on her article titled: What determines permissiveness toward corruption? A study of attitudes in Latin America.

Lavena (2013) observed that corruption is seen as damaging the public realm, reducing the credibility of institutions and endangering the status of public ethos (p.346). She further observed that when studying the theoretical perspective of corruption, one should focus on understanding corruption permissiveness or cultural value and attitude behind increased levels of justification of rule-breaking behavior among citizens of the country.

Cecilia Lavena stated that moving beyond the study of corruption perception, her work aimed to describe and explain what is behind citizen justification or rule - breaking behavior by analyzing cross-national differences in corruption permissiveness (Lavena, 2013, p. 349).

Figure 1



Source: Lavena, (2013, p.340).

The assumptions of corruption permissiveness theory (CPT) holds that social characteristics, cultural values and political beliefs or attitude may affect levels of corruption permissiveness in different ways. In the study of cultural dimensions of corruption, Swamy, Knack, Lee, and Azfar (2001) found that women are less likely to condone bribe taking (Rivas, 2006).

Most scholars are interested in the role of age differences and educational level in increasing or reducing individual willingness to justify corrupt behavior (Lavena, 2013; Seligan, 2002; Hofstede, 2001). Their findings suggest that a generation effect might evidence lower levels of corruption permissiveness. Swamy, et al, (2001) consider that public knowledge of the written codes of conduct and laws reduces levels of corruption permissiveness, as more education is an indicator of being more critical and knowledgeable of the political system and less willing to tolerate corruption. In

areas of ethnic diversity, researchers suggest that an ethnic and linguistic difference determines individual levels of corruption permissiveness (Lavena, 2013, p. 351; Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorrison, 2007; p. 449). Deeply divided societies may reflect more demand for corrupt services at any given price, making members of certain ethnic groups feel that demanding favour from co-ethnics in office is the only effective way to obtain service, hence systematically allowing for wrongful behavior (Lavena, 2013).

You and Khagram (2005) study on whether greater levels of inequality are conducive to corruption and from their findings concluded that inequality if income increases corruption through material and normative mechanism since survival is key. Thus, the wealthy are more likely to believe that corruption is an acceptable way of preserving and advancing their position in society, since such behavior goes unpunished and social networks of corruption expands. In the same manner, Melgar and Rossi (2009, p.6) observed that income determines higher levels of permissiveness among citizens of different employment status (class struggle and consciousness). Their study showed that unemployment does not influence willingness to justify an illegal action, but being employed full time decreases the probability of being permissiveness (p.6).

Inglehart, (2000, p.80) in his study on culture and democracy, opined that “culture is path dependant”, demonstrating that “distinctive cultural zones exist” with highly distinct value systems that persistently help to shape important phenomena (p.80). He proposed that there are two key dimensions of cross-cultural variation: traditional/rational –legal and survival/self-expression values. The traditional dimension reflects “the construct between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not; emphasis on interpersonal trust; as pro-life stands on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide; social conformity; high level of national pride” (p. 83).

The survival dimension is related to societies reflecting “low levels of subjective wellbeing; low interpersonal trust; relatively intolerant towards out-groups; emphasizing materialist values; favouring authoritarian governments” (Lavena, 2013, p.351; Inglehart, 2000, p.84). The desire for freedom is considered to be a universal human aspiration among cultures moving from survival values to wellbeing and self-expression value. Thus, this shift is expected to be reflected in the levels of corruption permissiveness; citizens who feels they are free to choose their own destiny and control their own lives will be more prone to endorse democratic values, and express lower levels of corruption permissiveness as a way of exercising accountability (Lavena 2013).

Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) observed that strong self-expression value seems to be a sufficient condition to create a minimum amount of support for democracy. They view participation as a political attitude related to self-expression values. The possibility of power abuse by institutions such as the police, department of state security, military and political parties may influence the level of corruption permissiveness in Nigeria. Mistrust in institutions allows for increased levels of permissiveness, the feeling of alienation toward government might result in few citizens

holding politicians accountable. Political corruption is strongly influenced by “party preference” or ideology, study has shown that extreme right voters are more likely to think that politicians are corrupt (Lavena, 2013; Van de Walle, 2008, p.225; Inglehart, 2000).

Political Parties in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective from 1960 – 2019

Factually, political parties in Nigeria before 1960, originated as a result of religious and tribal differences that exist at that time. For instance, political parties like: Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) 1922, NYM (1934,), NCNC (1944), AG (1950) and NPC (1949) Aristotle, (2014, p.7). Attempts will be made to examine political parties in historical perspectives from the first republic to the fourth with attention on some major political incidents like elections and reasons for the failure of those republics.

The First Republic 1960 -1966

The first republic started from October 1, 1960 to January 15, 1966 with the three major parties representing the then three regions and nationalities – Action Group (AG) in the west, National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) in the east, and Northern People Congress (NPC) in the north. The first general election in Nigeria on the eve of independence was contested by these three political parties with electoral victories reflected in their regions of origin. In the East, the NCNC won with a large majority and the NPC swept the North. In the West, the AG initially won 44 seats but this increased to 49 as some NCNC members declared for the Action Group (Brown 2013, p. 175). Nigerian political system during this era was described by Crawford Young as a “three-person game, with bidding shares ultimately determined by the electoral mechanism. The three actors enter the contest with a given demographic allocation 29 percent for the Hausa-Fulani, 20 percent for the Yoruba, 17 percent for the Ibo - if they succeeded in mobilizing their full cultural community” (Young, 1993, p.292). The two referred to here were Alhaji Tafawa Balawe (Prime Minister), Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (President), and Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Leader of Opposition) following the NPC-NCNC alliance. As at this time, Nigeria adopted the parliamentary system of government.

The ruling political elites at the time faced inter and intra-party rivalries – the AG, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief S. L. Akintola rivalry resulting to election crisis in the Western Region in 1962 and subsequent imposition of state of emergency in the region on 29th May, 1962 (Harriman, 2006, p.4); the treason trial of Chief Awolowo and some AG chieftains; the controversial 1963 census which declared the North more populated with 55%; the absence of a truly national party, and the last struck was the January 15, 1966 coup launched by Major C.K. Nzeogwu which sacked the first republic and opened a new page in the political history of the country – military incursion into politics (Brown, 2013, p.175).

The Second Republic, 1979-1983

After about 13 years of military rule, the military under the Murtala and Obasanjo’s regime was faithful to a transition to civilian rule. This transition programme produced the following: A constitution (1979) which provided for among other things an executive president after the American model. This was a departure from the British- styled

parliamentary system. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) of Murtala - Obasanjo approved a five-stage (5) programme designed to ensure a smooth transition to civil rule (Odinkalu, 2001, p.65).

These were – state creation, settling down of the created states before election, lifting up of ban on political activities, the final stages – elections into the states and federal houses before handing over (Brown, 2013, p.176).

The winner of the 1979 general election contested by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Chief Awolowo; Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), Nnamdi Azikiwe; National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Alhaji Shehu Shagari; Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), Alhaji Aminu Kano; Nigerian National Congress, NNC; Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim. They polled the following Alhaji Shehu Shagari – 5, 698, 857, chief Obafemi Awolowo – 4, 916, 651, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 2, 822, 523, Alhaji Aminu Kano – 1, 732, 113; Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim – 1, 686, 489 (Ojiako, in Brown, 2013). The Olusegun Obasanjo regime handed over power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari whose electoral victory was contested by Chief Awolowo and roundly condemned as a farce by other political parties. The election was petitioned by Chief Awolowo on the grounds that Alhaji Shehu Shagari was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes in contravention of section 34A (i) (c) (ii) of the Electoral Decree 1977 and section 7 of the Electoral (Amendment) Decree 1978 (210), (p.176).

This republic failed due to the loss of faith in the electoral umpire – Federal Electoral Commission, FEDECO which declared Shagari winner even when his party polled 25% of votes in 12 States but 19.94% of votes in Kano state, which were the 13th state and the turn out of the litigation. Political office holders were corrupt, ruined economy, inter/intra party rivalries and the 1983 electoral fraud which returned Shagari for a second term caused the military to intervene on December 31, 1983. The collapse of the NPN-led government could probably be manifestation of the curses by both Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Awolowo on different occasions. Chief Awolowo warned that “the NPN would self-destruct (sic) by its own greed” (Brown, 2013; Babarinsa, 2003, p.257).

The Third Republic, 1985 -1993

By this time, Nigeria has gotten use to the reign of the generals and the martial music that announced the end and beginning of another. The General Buhari’s junta was sacked in a palace coup by General Ibrahim Babangida, the self-styled military president in Nigeria political history. The Babangida’s administration thinned the number of political parties from five in the second republic to two in the third republic – the Social Democratic Party, SDP, and the National Republic Convention, NRC. These emerged out of the many political associations formed to terminate IBB’s regime in 1992. A minority group of the 1986 political Bureau, had proposed 1992 as terminal date while the majority, 1990. Decree No. 19 of 1987 established the National Electoral Commission, NEC. The twin political parties had government imposed pseudo – ideological orientation – the NRC – “a little to the right and the SDP – “a little to the left” (Alkali; 1999, p.1-2). Thus earned the parties the satirical description of “government” or “official parastatals” as they were government funded (Brown, 2013). Declaring his administrations resolve to rid the political system of the

ghost of the negative influences of the previous era, represented by the “old brigade (politicians), General Babangida declared that his administration:

Will not handover political power to any person or persons no matter how distinguished or wealthy but rather to a virile civilian political organization which is openly committed to the purpose of power in the national, nation’s interest. Those who think otherwise and who are now parading themselves as presidential candidates for 1992 would be disappointed in the end (p.2).

By the above, the hitherto existing 17 political associations were the platform on which these “old Brigade” politicians stood. Discrediting the process and action of the November 1992 presidential primaries which saw the emergence of Alhaji Adamu Ciroma (National Republican Convention - NRC) and Shehu Yar’adua (Social Democratic Party - SDP), General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) cancelled the primaries in the following words:

It is no longer news that the events which preceded the armed forces ruling council’s decision constitute a set back to the transition programme and pose a serious dilemma to me, not only as a person but also as a general and officer of the Nigerian Army, the president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Nigeria...No less in dilemma are our country men and women who looked forward to that date, January 2, 1993, when our country was supposed to commence the full stage of the transition programme and from other democratic nations around the world (Brown, 2013, p.176; Akali, 1999, p.2).

The above action, IBB claimed was predicated upon the following:

All presidential aspirants were extremely distrustful of one another... the committee of aspirants only knew those they do not want, but have no idea of who they want, except their individual selves, the aspirants imbibed the worst culture of the Nigeria political class that feels and sees any election as the last election which must be contested, fought and won at all costs. The explanation for the foregoing pathologies can be sought in the heavy financial investment committed to politics... the presidency should not be for sale (p.177).

There were trifling amount of doubts here and there, with the quantum of reasons given by IBB, Nigerians hoped for a credible process to usher in purposeful and people centered leadership. This they showed on June 12, 1993 with the election of Chief M. K. O Abiola (SDP) devoid of ethno-religious sentiment (like the flawed process in the past) Brown, (2013, p.177). The prolonged stay of the military and their atrocities was one mobilizing factor for Nigerians participation in the general election. The popularity and general acceptability of these candidates were tested through the unconventional “option A4” – election to be conducted hierarchically from the ward level. The “old Brigade will not let it be (the Third World’s mentality which negates the spirit of good sportsmanship) as series of

mitigations were filled to stop the polls and announcing of results by the chairman NEC Prof Humphrey Nwosu (Akali, 1999).

Reneging on his words, General IBB announced the annulment of the polls repealing Decrees 13 and 52 of 1993, on the basis of which the election had been conducted (Brown, 2013). Government claimed the action was expedient "in order to save the judiciary from further ridicule and erosion of confidence and that a delay of seven days by NEC, in order to comply with the court injunction of June 10, 1993, before conducting the election could have saved the nation all the subsequent crises and upheaval" (Akali, 1999, p.7).

The above claim and action (shifting blame on NEC), undermined the collective sensibilities of Nigerians and a grand style by the northern oligarchs represented by IBB to retain power in perpetuity. They would rather prefer a northern Muslim to a southern Muslim to be president. Following the turmoil associated with the annulment and sacking of Nwosu, Prof. Okon E. Uya was appointed to mop up the mess. The June 12 presidential election led to the collapse of IBB's junta. He literally stepped aside for an interim national government, ING headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan whose reign was for 82 days and was replaced by General Sani Abacha in November 1993. Babangida's regime witnessed social decadent, economic decline, the fall of the middle class, and the most prolonged political crisis since the civil war (Uya, 1992, p.54; Falola, 2001, p.23), marked by both political and economic failures.

Generals Sani Abacha and Abdulsalam Abubakar Juntas

Nigeria entered the worse years in its modern history under three successive regimes of Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, each worse than his predecessor, their styles were different, Buhari was stern but organized; Babangida was urbane but ruthless; and Abacha was crude and callous. By the time the three regimes were ended, the military had been discredited, its officers had lost credibility professionalism was destroyed and entire military force was deeply resented by the public. Nigerians had lost hope in their future (Falola, 2001, p.23). This was the grim description of the three Generals poised to perpetuate the northern mandate and their institution. Under the Abacha junta (from November 17-June 8, 1998) Nigeria became a pariah state recording the most authoritarian rulership ever in her political history. His transition was as insincere as the five leprous fingered political parties - Congress of National Consensus, CNC; Grassroots Democratic Movement, GDM; National Conscience Party of Nigeria, NCPN; Movement for Democratic Justice, MDJ, and United Nigeria Congress Party, UNCP. In 1996, less rancorous but teleguided elections to local governments, states and national legislatures were conducted by National Electoral Commission of Nigeria, NECON, but successful candidates were yet to be inaugurated (Brown, 2013, p.177; Fwatshak, 2009, p.18).

Having literally shot down the historic presidential election result of 12 June, 1993, and the political structures of his predecessor's transition programme, Abacha would be ferocious in the battle of political credibility and legitimacy (Amuno, 2001, p.1). The president-elect in the June 12, 1993 was incarcerated and mandate denied, following his self-

declaration as president on June 11, 1994 (a year after victory at the polls). The political deviled caused the National Democratic Coalition, NADECO, a pro-democracy group like others to push for the re-democratization of Nigeria - first with the return mandate to MKO Abiola (p.2). During this period there was insecurity of lives and property of perceived/imagined political opponents. Unfortunately for Abacha, his self- succession planned transition programme from the first quarter of 1996 to the third quarter of 1998 was short lived due to his sudden death on June 8, 1998 (Brown, 2013).

The sudden death of General Sani Abacha led to the emergence of General Abdulsalam who planned and implemented a short transition programme with the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission, INEC, and the registration of these political parties, People Democratic Party, PDP; All Peoples Party, APP; Alliance for Democracy, AD. Political detainees were released (Brown, 2013; Dkihru, 2011). These political parties had traces of ideology and composition with their forebears in the first republic, for example, the AD was Yoruba, an off-shoot of Awolowo's AG. The presidential election was between two candidates: Chief Olusegun Obansajo (PDP) and Chief Olu Falae (APP - AD). Starting with the South West geopolitical zone could be explained to be a compensatory/reconciliatory mechanism for the annulled June 12, 1993 polls. The PDP candidate won and was sworn-in on May 29, 1999 as the second elected president after Alhaji Shehu Shagari, in May 29, henceforth became Democracy Day in Nigeria (P.178).

The Fourth Republic 1999 - 2019.

Nigeria's fourth republic has witnessed six (6) general elections (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019) and is yet to show profound evidence of a growing democracy (Dkihru, 2011, p.1) the lamentation is appropriate owing to inherent challenges (mostly avoidable). The Abubakar's regime mid-wifed this republic in admirable manner but the electoral umpires lacked the credibility to conduct free and fair elections (Adingupu, 2012).

With judicial intervention the registration process for political parties was liberalized, hence after the 1999 election, 30 political parties were registered and the entrance of many retired military officers (mostly wealthy ex- Generals) probably a ploy to stave off coups in the country. On the performance of the umpire (INEC), the 2003 and 2007 were appalling. For instance, electoral tickets were given to people who never contested primaries and total votes polled more than accredited voters in a polling unit. The courts were thus stuff-filled with election petitions, many states had re-run or the wrong candidate's stolen mandate retrieved and conferred on the rightful candidate. This was the case in Edo State (in 2008 and 2012), Ekiti and Osun had the same experience. There was often rift between the executive and legislative arms of government (Dkihru, 2011, p.1).

Threats of impeachment of the President, impeachment of senate presidents (from the south east), corruption, the botch third- term bid of Obasanjo, the politics that surrounded the illness, treatment, death and replacement of President Yar'adua in 2010, the emergence of a president from the minority extraction; the issue of zoning, the

registration and deregistration of political parties and the recent mega merger – All Progressive Congress, APC to challenge the electoral dominance of the PDP. It should be stated that most of these parties are neither national nor parties in the strict sense (Dkihru, 2011). It is because of this that Prof. Itse Sagay, a renowned constitutional lawyer maintains that; our fourth republic democracy is complete failure in the sense that the very first household of what constitute democracy has failed. That is free, fair and credible election (Adingupu, 2012). This republic which has put an end to 16 years of consecutive military rule is remarkable for one thing – civilian – to civilian transition which informs the hope of Nigerians in Nigeria (Brown, 2013, p.178).

The Nigeria's 2015 presidential election was the fifth in a row since the military left the political scene in 1999. PDP which has been the ruling party since 1999 faced its toughest opposition in APC which was formed on February 6, 2013 with the merger of Action Congress of Nigeria (CAN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and a faction of the All Progressive Grad Alliance (APGA) Olakunle and Modupe (2015; p.14).

The march, 28 Presidential elections was quite successful albeit, there were hitches in some polling units across the country due to the late arrival of electoral materials and the ineffectiveness of the Smart Card Reader (SCR). Former military ruler, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd) emerged as winner of the presidential election. The election was the fourth time running that Buhari had been contesting as a presidential aspirant. Buhari won with a total number of 15, 424, 921 votes as against Goodluck Jonathan's 12, 853, 162 votes. Buhari historic victory marked the triumph of democracy as it was the first time that an opposition party will upstaged the incumbent government in Nigeria through legitimate means (Olakunde and Modupe, 2015, p.15).

The 2019 presidential election as usual in Nigeria was heralded with tension, blame games, anticipated violence campaign of calumny, threat and the desire to win at all cost (Babayo, 2019, p.136) It was another presentation of the litmus test for Nigerian democratization. In the first place, over 70 political parties were registered and about seventy-three (73) parties fielded candidates for the presidential election. The two major Contenders in APC and PDP, the large number of parties made the 2019 Presidential Election unique affairs in comparison with the previous presidential elections in the country. The result of the 2019 presidential election recorded the lowest turnout in comparison with that of 2011 and 2015. In 2011, a turnout of 56. 4% was recorded, in 2015, 46.8% voters' turnout was recorded, while in 2019 only 39.09% turnout was recorded. Some of the reasons for the low turnout is political apathy, postponement of the election from 14th February, 2019 to 23rd march, 2019. The election set another dimension in Nigerian political history because the two major contenders were Muslims from the northern extraction (Babayo, 2019, p.132).

The 2019 Presidential election, Muhammadu Buhari of the APC Scored 15, 191, 847, while Alhaji Atiku Abubakar of the PDP Scored 11, 262, 978. The results of the Presidential election in the History of Nigeria are clearly pointing towards

ethnic, religious and regional voting background (Babayo, 2019).

Corruption and Political Party: The European Union (EU) Report of 2019 General Election in Nigeria

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Nigeria released its final report on the 15th of June, 2019, Concerning Nigeria's 2019 general elections, which contain thirty(30) recommendations to improve future electoral processes. The mission concluded that the systemic failings was seen in the elections, and the relatively low levels of voter participation, show the need for fundamental electoral reform. "Such reform needs political leadership that is dedicated to the rights of Nigerian citizens, and an inclusive process of national dialogue involving state institutions, parties, civil society and the media," said EU Chief Observer, Maria Arena, at a press conference in Abuja. "This needs to be urgently undertaken to allow time for debate, legislative changes and implementation well in advance of the next elections," she added.

Overall, the EU EOM concluded the elections were marked by severe operational and transparency shortcomings, electoral security problems and low turnout. Positively, however, the elections were competitive, parties were able to campaign and civil society enhanced accountability. Leading parties, the EU EOM said, were at fault in not reining in acts of violence and intimidation by their supporters, and abuse of incumbency at federal and state levels.

The EUEOM's report stated that, except for federal radio, state media primarily served the interests of the president or the governor at state level. Journalists were subject to harassment, and scrutiny of the electoral process was at times compromised with some independent observers being obstructed in their work, including by security agencies. The EU EOM noted that INEC worked in a difficult environment and made some improvements, such as simplifying voting procedures. However, considerable weaknesses remained. Operational deficiencies led to the postponement of the elections, there were insufficient checks and transparency in the results process, as well as a general lack of public communication and information.

The elections became increasingly marred by violence and intimidation, with the role of the security agencies becoming more contentious as the process progressed. The EU EOM reported that this damaged the integrity of the electoral process and may deter future participation. During collation of the federal results, EU observers directly witnessed or received reports of intimidation of INEC officials in twenty (20) states.

While the legal framework broadly provides for democratic elections and some improvements were made to the Constitution, various legal shortcomings remained, including in relation to the use of smart card readers. The EUEOM also noted the suspension of the chief justice by the president a few weeks before the elections, which it said was seen to lack due process and reportedly undermined judicial independence.

Other issues highlighted in the report include: conflicting and late rulings on electoral disputes that undermined

opportunity for remedy and created uncertainty; the dysfunctional regulation of political finance; very few electoral offences resulting in arrest or prosecution; problems with the collection of permanent voter cards; and the further fall in the number of women elected.

Positively, however, the report noted that parties and candidates were able to campaign, with freedoms of assembly, expression and movement largely respected. The EU EOM also emphasized the effective role played by civil society organizations in promoting election reform and positively contributing to the accountability of the process. The report makes 30 recommendations for consideration, but priorities the following seven (7):

1. Strengthen INEC procedures for the collation of results to improve integrity and confidence in electoral outcomes.
2. Establish requirements in law for full results transparency, with data easily accessible to the public.
3. Considerably strengthen INEC's organizational and operational capacity, as well as its internal communication.
4. The inter-agency body responsible for electoral security to work more transparently and inclusively, with regular consultations with political parties and civil society.
5. Introduce a legal requirement for political parties to have a minimum representation of women among candidates.
6. Electoral tribunals to also cover pre-election cases in order to improve access to remedy and to avoid petitions being taken to different courts at the same time.
7. Reform the licensing system for the broadcast media to provide for media pluralism and diversity in all of Nigeria's states.

Following an invitation from INEC, the EU EOM was present in Nigeria between 5 January and 7 April 2019. It observed the presidential and National Assembly elections on 23 February, the governorship and State House of Assembly elections on 9 March as well as supplementary governorship elections on 23 March.

The mission's forty (40) long-term observers went to all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. The mission's mandate was to observe all aspects of the electoral process and assess the extent to which the elections complied with Nigeria's international and regional commitments for elections, as well as with national legislation. The EU EOM was independent of EU institutions, the Delegation of the European Union to Nigeria and EU member states.

Conclusion

The beauty and relevance of democracy depends on creating a conducive political society and economic environment devoid of discrimination, fear, poverty, disease, ethnicity and marginalization where every citizen has a stake in the survival of the country; where the basic necessities of life are guaranteed. A situation whereby the rule of law and fundamental human rights are relegated do not augur well

for the sustenance of democracy. It is clear from the analysis that Nigeria's political parties from 1960-2019 has witnessed some challenging situation like: ethnicity, corruption, violence, military intervention, civil and electoral deficiencies. Despite these challenges, the people are still managing their union with the hope of building a strong and united nation, with a stable democracy that would stand the test of time and compete with other developed democracies in the world, but the political class should not take the hopes of Nigerians for granted; they should also be conscious that Nigerians are wiser than them.

Recommendations

Nigeria's new democratic process and institutions must be strengthened and made to work. Historical evidence show that political parties anywhere in the world plays concrete role in liberation struggle, in the installation of democratic dispensation, and in the consideration of democracy. Thus, to strengthen Nigerian democracy, the following recommendations are made:

1. While serving as vehicle for the struggle for power; political parties should also serve as instrument for nation-building and mobilization in an ethnically plural society.
2. For democracy the independent of the judiciary, freedom of press, separation of powers between the organs of government, the principles of the rule of law must be observed.

References

- [1] Adingupu, C. (2016, May, 12). The Fourth Republic has Failed says Sagay. "Vanguard: <http://www.vanguardngi.com>.
- [2] Agi, S. P. I. (2003). *An Approach to the Study of Organization of Government*: Pigasiann and Corace Publishers, 267, 270-290.
- [3] Akali, M. N. (1999). *Nigeria in the Transition Year 1993-1999*: National Institute Press, 1-2.
- [4] Akers, R. L, and Sellers, C. S. (2009). *Criminology Theories* (5th ed.): Oxford University Press.
- [5] Akpotor, S. (1982). *Corruption: The Civil Society and Government Philosophy and Politics*: Joga Press, 145-150.
- [6] Alatas, S. H. (1990). *Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- [7] Aristotle, I. J. (2008). Corruption and ethical issues in law enforcement: A challenge to legal Policies Implementation in Nigeria: (*Unpublished APPA Journal Article*) Unical, 2-17.
- [8] Aristotle, I. J. (2008b). Corruption, Political Party System and Nigerian Democracy. *Bassey Andah Journal of Cultural Studies*, 1(1), 133-139.
- [9] Aristotle, I. J. (2012). *Corruption and the Consolidation of Nigeria's Democracy: Trends, Problems and Prospect*: Kadmon Printing Press, 3-7.
- [10] Aristotle, I. J. (2013). *Local Government Administration in Nigeria: From Grace to Grass*: Kadmon Printing Press, 95 -125.
- [11] Babarinsa, D. (2003). *House of War*: Spectrum Books Ltd, 250-259.
- [12] Babayo, S. (2019). The 2019 Presidential Election in Nigeria. An Analysis of the voting pattern, Issues and impact. *Malaysian Journal of Society and Space*, 15(2), 129-140. www.eueomnigeria2019.eu.

- [13] Bernard, T. J, Snipes, J. B, and Gerould, A. L. (2010). *Vold's theoretical Criminology* (6th ed.), Oxford University Press.
- [14] Brown, G. M (2013). Nigerian Political System: An Analysis. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3(10), 172-178. www.ijhssnet.com.
- [15] Bussell, J, and Ackerman, S. R. (2015). *Typologies of Corruption a Pragmatic Approach*: Transaction Publishers.
- [16] Chappell, A. T, and Piquero, A.T. (2004). *Applying Social Learning theory to Police Misconduct. Deviant Behaviour*, 25, 89 – 108.
- [17] Coleman, J. S, and Rosberg, C.G. (1964). *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*: University of California Press, 41.
- [18] Curtis, M. (1978). *Comparative Government and Politics*: Harper and Row Publishers.
- [19] Dhikru, A. Y. (2011). Nigeria's fourth Republic and the Challenges of a faltering Democratization. *African Studies Quarterly*: 12(3), 1.
- [20] Dreher, A, Kotsogiannis, C, and McCorriston, S. (2007). Corruption around the World: Evidence from a Structural Model. *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 35(1), 443-466.
- [21] Eldersveld, S. J. (1964). *Political Parties: A behavioral Analysis*: Rand Mc Nelly Publishers, 123.
- [22] Folola, T. (2001). *Culture and Customs of Nigeria*: Greenwood Press, 18.
- [23] Free English Language Dictionary. <http://www.audioenglish.net/dictionary>.
- [24] Fwatshak, U. S. (2009). Economic and Political Environment of Elections and Expectations of Nigerians from Elections. In *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*. 18, 1-2.
- [25] Harriman, T. (2006). "Is there a future for Democracy in Nigeria?". Public Lecture at the Department of International Development. Oxford University. (5th June, 2006).
- [26] Hofstede, G. O. (2001). *Culture Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviour, Institutions and Organization Across Nations*. (2nd Edition): Sage Publishers.
- [27] Inglehart, R. F, and Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The human Development Sequences*: Cambridge University Press.
- [28] Jinadu, L. A. (2011). Inter-party Dialogue in Nigeria: Examining the Past Present Parties Dialogue Series. "A Conference on electoral process" Abuja. October 4, 2011.
- [29] Lavena, C. (2013). What Determines Permissiveness Toward Corruption? A study of Attitudes in Latin America. *Public Integrity*, Fall 2013, 15(4), 345-365.
- [30] Melgar, N, and Rossi, M. (2009). *Permissiveness Toward illegal. Action's in Uruguay Are Belief in God, Income and Education Relevant?* Vol. (10). Department of Economics, Universidad de la Republica.
- [31] Meng, Q, and Friday P. C. (2010). *Corruption in transitional China: A theoretical Conceptualization*. In V. Konarska, and J. Lac-howski (Eds). Major problems of Contemporary Criminal law, Criminology and Victimology. Wolterskluwer publishing Office, polish Branch.
- [32] Okoyen, E. (2019). Election Security and Sustainable Democratic practice in Nigeria: The Role of the Department of state Services (DSS) in Bayelsa 2019 General Elections. (*Unpublished M.SC Thesis*).
- [33] Olakunle, O, and Modupe, A. (2015). An Overview of 2015 General Elections in Nigeria. *Arabian Journal of Business and management Review*, 5(5), 13-20.
- [34] Olusola, O. K. (2016) Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Explanation. *Issues in Social Science Journal*, (1), 57-64.
- [35] Rivas, M. F. (2006). *An Experiment on Corruption and Gender*. Document No.08/06. Universidad de la Republica.
- [36] Sandholtz, W, and Taagepera, R. (2005). Corruption, Culture, and Communism. *International Review of Sociology*, 15(15), 109-131
- [37] Seligson, M. A (2002). The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Corruptive study of four Latin American Countries. *Journal of Politics*, 64(1), 408-433.
- [38] Singer, S. D, and Hensley, C. (2004). Applying Social learning theory to childhood and adolescent fire-setting: can it lead to serial murder? *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*. 48, 461.
- [39] Steenbeek, W, and Hipp, J. R. (2011). A longitudinal test of Social disorganization theory: feedback effects among Cohesion, Social Control and disorder. *Criminology*, 49(3), 833-871.
- [40] Swamy, A, Knack, S, Lee, Y, and Azfor, O. (2001). Gender and Corruption. *Journal of Development Economics*, 64(1), 25-55.
- [41] Tittle, C. R. (2004). Social learning theory and the explanation of crime: A guide for new century. *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Review*, 33(6), 716.
- [42] Travits, M. (2010). Why do people engage in Corruption? The case of Estonia. *Social Forces*, 88(3), 1257-1279.
- [43] Uduigwomen, A. F. (2006). *Introduction to Ethics: Trends, problems and perspectives*. (ed) Offiong, O. A: Jochrisem Published, 201-215
- [44] Uduigwomen, A. F, and Ozumba, G.O. (1997). *Leadership and Nigeria's Socio-ethical malaise: Nigeria Government and Politics*: AAU Industries, 62-69.
- [45] Ugwu, U. (2008), Nigeria, Elites Class and Political Culture: The challenges of value degeneration and sustainable Democracy. Calabar: (*Unpublished APPA Journal Article*). Unical, 2, 8, 16.
- [46] Uya, E.O. (200). *Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria*: Clear Lines publishers. .5.
- [47] Van de Walle, S. (2008). *Perceptions of Corruption as Distrust? Cause and Effects in Attitudes towards Government*. In *Ethics, Integrity and the Politics Governance* (eds.) L.W. Huberts, M. Jeron, and C.L. HJurkiewicz. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 215-236.
- [48] You, S, and Khagram, S. (2005). A Comparative Study of inequality and Corruption. *American Sociological Review*. 70 (1), 136-157.
- [49] Young, C. (1993). *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*: University Press, 285-295
- [50] Zhang, Y, Cao, L, and Vanghn, M. (2009). Social Support and corruption: structural determinants of Corruption in the world. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 42(2), 204-207.